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WE MUST NEVER FORGET THAT IT IS AN
INKBLOT WE ARE EXPOUNDING: SECTION
10(b) AS RORSCHACH TEST
Joseph A. Grundfest*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A Rorschach test is a series of inkblots.' Inkblots have no
intrinsic meaning.2 They are inkblots. The patient describes images
The analyst interprets the patient's
evoked by the inkblots.'
descriptions.4
Ideally, there would be no connection between Rorschach tests
Ideally,
and the challenges posed by statutory interpretation.
Congress would draft clear statutes that provide precise guidance to
the courts and to society.

We do not live in an ideal world. Congress often legislates with
Sometimes the imprecision is inadvertent.
great imprecision.
Sometimes it is calculated.' But whether imprecision is the consequence of oversight or design, when Congress compels the judiciary

to interpret exceedingly vague or incomplete statutory language,
Congress places the judiciary in the injudicious position of having to
interpret a "legislative inkblot"-that is, a statutory utterance that has
no intrinsic meaning but which must be plumbed for deeper consequence.
* Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Commissioner, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 1985-1990. I would like to thank Mel Eisenberg, Si Lome, and Therese
Maynard for provoking me to write this Article. Needless to say, I absolve them of
responsibility, express or implied, for the views expressed herein.
1. See, e.g., JOHN E. EXNER, JR., THE RORSCHACH: A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM 3

(2d ed. 1986); MAX L. HUTr ET AL, PSYCHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF INTERPERSONAL
BEHAVIOR 394-97 (1966).
2. EXNER, supra note 1, at 27-28; HuTr, supra note 1, at 395.
3. HUTr, supra note 1, at 395.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S9694 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Armstrong complaining that vagueness in the Americans with Disabilities Act would create
a "legislative Rorschach test, an inkblot whose meaning and significance will be
determined through years of costly litigation").
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The demand for judicial interpretation of legislative inkblots has
spawned a cottage industry that generates rules, standards, and
principles for the interpretation of vague or incomplete legislative
language.6 Much of this literature is imaginative, well-reasoned, and
carefully considered. But no matter how cogent, this literature cannot
paper over the fact that many principles of statutory construction are,
at root, efforts to impose meaning where there is none.
When a poorly drafted statute compels the judiciary to employ
these interpretive principles, some academics rise and assume the
mantle of Rorschachian analyst. They criticize the judicial interpretation of the statutory inkblot as passive, aggressive, neurotic, obsessive,
controlling, vindictive, or worse, because the court's interpretation of
the blot differs from the academic analyst's.
I have little interest in that game. Inkblots are inkblots. They
should be treated as inkblots. When a statute presents itself as an
inkblot, it should be construed as narrowly as practicable lest it
become a breeding ground for competing judicial imaginations.7 To
one Justice the blot is a cow. To another it is Mount Rushmore.
Justices can defend their own interpretations of the blot by picking a
suitable interpretive principle from a long list of plastic standards.8
Who is to say that any Justice is wrong when they are, after all,
interpreting a blot? The winner in this debate is the Justice who rises
to proclaim, "Stop! We must never forget that it is an inkblot we are
expounding!

'

Granted, reasonable minds can and will differ as to whether a
particular statute is simply a difficult piece of abstract legislative
expressionism with a discernible but nonrepresentational message, or
whether it is an inkblot. In recognition of this problem, this Article

6. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND TH4E CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988);
ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 787-93 (1995); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 14 n.5 (1995); Therese H. Maynard,
Foreword FourthAnnual Fritz B. Burns Lecture-CentralBank: The Methodology, the
Message, and the Future, 29 LoY.- L.A. L. REV. 1, 6 n.29 (1995).
7. I recognize that this proposal is itself a rule of statutory construction. However,
as explained in part V, infra, I believe this rule is the one most reasonably applied and
easily defended in the context of § 10(b).
8. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
323-33 (1994) (collecting canons of statutory construction used by the United States
Supreme Court from 1986 through 1991).
9. With apologies to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)
(Marshall, C.J.) ("[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.").
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draws no conclusions regarding categorical principles of statutory
construction as they might apply to the vast majority of statutes. Nor
is this Article a defense of strict textualism as an appropriate mode of
statutory construction for a broad class of statutes."
This Article's goal is far more modest. Its goal is to persuade the
reader that in the wild and sometimes wacky world of statutory
construction, when a statute presents itself as an inkblot, it should be
construed as narrowly as practicable. Few statutes better warrant a
narrow interpretation because of their inkblot characteristics than
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" and rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder. 2 This support for narrow construction is
rooted in straightforward institutional and pragmatic considerations.
If a statute presents itself as an inkblot, then any attempt to fashion
a broader interpretation inevitably relies on the subjective and
unguided preference of the judiciary rather than the articulated
guidance of the elected legislature. Indeed the task of defining the
narrowest practical interpretation of an inkblot is difficult enough, and
any broader charge simply provides
fuel for more dramatically
13
subjective controversy and confusion.
Few cases better illustrate section 10(b)'s inkblot characteristics
than the cause of this Symposium, the Supreme Court's decision in
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank. 4 Central Bank held that there

is no implied private right of action against those who aid or abet a
violation of section 10(b). 5 This holding was contrary to the ruling
of every court of appeals that had previously addressed the issue.16
Central Bank spawned a bitter storm of protest from some segments
of the securities bar. The Court's holding "shocked lawyers who
represent investors."' 7 Those lawyers bemoaned the decision as a

10. See Eisenberg, supra note 6.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
12. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1995).
13. While Professor Eisenberg's critique of strict textualism is an attack on the
Supreme Court's stated rationale in Central Bank, I do not read it as necessarily rejecting
a principle of narrow interpretation in the face of a cryptic legislative utterance. Indeed,
Professor Eisenberg articulates a policy-based rationale for construing § 10(b) to preclude
aiding-and-abetting liability, but he does not endorse it. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 20-22.
14. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
15. Id. at 1455.
16. Id. at 1456 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
17. Sharon Walsh, Supreme Court Limits Whom Defrauded Investors Can Sue, WASH.
POST, Apr. 20, 1994, at Al, A12.
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"travesty""8 and a "tragic day for investors."19 The Court's logic
was denigrated as the consequence of a judicial "rigidity and
callousness that is disconcerting."2 The decision was also reviled as
a "judicial wolf in sheep's clothing, an act of extreme judicial activism
carried out while purporting to employ the strictest possible interpretive means."'" Whew.
This Article suggests that the critics of Central Bank are wrong.
They are wrong to predict that CentralBank will significantly weaken
the federal securities laws. They are also wrong to so harshly criticize
the motives or logic of the Supreme Court's decision. The federal
securities laws in general, and section 10(b) in particular, are hardly
models of clarity. Reasonable minds can differ as to the import of the
section 10(b) inkblot, and honorable Justices strongly opposed to
fraud in the nation's securities markets can legitimately oppose
limitless extensions of section 10(b)'s cryptic language. The Supreme
Court's holding in Central Bank that the implied section 10(b) right
does not extend to private suits against aiders and abettors is hardly
beyond the pale, and certainly not a cause for invective.
The Court's critics would do well to remember that when they
criticize Central Bank they criticize an interpretation of a cause of
action that neither Congress nor the Securities and Exchange
Commission ever intended to create.' Moreover, interpreting the
intent of the section 10(b) implied private right is an inherently
quixotic exercise because, as the Court explained almost twenty years
ago, there is no original intent to divine.' Intentionalists in search
of original meaning thus run into the problem that "there is no there
there," 4 and would do just as well to kvetch about the ending of

18. Id. at Al (quoting Arthur Bryant, executive director of the Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice).
19. Id. (quoting Joseph Cotchett, "an attorney for the 23,000 bond holders who sued
the lawyers and accountants of convicted savings and loan executive Charles H. Keating,
Jr. and won $275 million").
20. Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on
Federaland State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 490 (1995).
21. Glen Wallace Roberts II, Note, 10(b) or Not 10(b): Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1239, 1265 (1995).
22. Section 10(b) "does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation,
and there is no indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5,
contemplated such a remedy." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
23. Id.
24. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1971) (describing
Oakland, California).
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Franz Schubert's Unfinished Symphony 2s as to complain about the
interpretation of the contours of a cause of action that Congress never
contemplated. 26 Thus, to borrow Professor Eisenberg's cogent ad-

monition that text is insufficient because interpretation must consider
"text in context,"'27 the problem with section 10(b)'s implied private

right is that its context is as vaporous as its text.
This Article takes a decidedly different approach to the debate

over CentralBank. This Article argues that the federal securities laws
in general, and section 10(b) in particular, pose inherently difficult
interpretive challenges for the Court because they contain provisions
that are cryptic in the extreme. This Article is a plea for compassion
for nine Justices forced to interpret statutory provisions that are so
complex, vague, and controversial that there is often no possible
construction free of serious critique. This Article is also an argument
in favor of a narrow approach to the interpretation of section 10(b),
much like the approach adopted in Central Bank.
The threshold challenge in supporting a narrow interpretation of
a statute on the grounds that it reads like an inkblot is to first reach
the conclusion that the statute is indeed an inkblot. Part II of this

Article supports the thesis that the federal securities laws have strong
inkblot characteristics by presenting a statistical analysis demonstrating that the Court has split 5-4 in cases interpreting the federal
securities laws with an unusually great frequency.' Part II further
demonstrates that these splits involve unusual and unstable coalitions,

25. FRANZ SCHUBERT, SYMPHONY IN B MINOR

(1822).

26. Some musicologists suggest that Schubert's Symphony in B minor-the Unfinished
Symphony-is in fact complete. 16 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND
MUSICIANS 761 (Stanley Sadie ed., 1980). This minority view would no doubt be latched
upon by intentionalists as the foundation for an extensive critique of the work's ending.
27. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 35 (emphasis in original).
28. Professor Maynard offers the hypothesis that the unusually high incidence of 5-4
decisions in cases construing the federal securities laws is the result of a clash between an
evolving hostility to implied private remedies and a commitment to stare decisis which
compels respect for decisions crafted in an earlier era when implied rights were found
more easily and construed more broadly. Maynard, supra note 6, at 4 n.19. This
explanation is not at all inconsistent with the "inkblot" explanation of section 10(b)
jurisprudence because, in order for Professor Maynard's hypothesized conflict to arise,
there must first exist a more fundamental dispute over the meaning of the statute. Thus,
instead of contradicting the "inkblot" hypothesis, Professor Maynard's hypothesis provides
a potential explanation for a mechanism that determines the tipping point that defines how
the Supreme Court decides 10b-5 cases: The line dividing majority from minority is the
line defined by the path-dependent balancing between the urge to respect staredecisis with
the desire to construe implied rights as narrowly as possible.
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and that unanimous decisions interpreting the federal securities laws
are also unusually rare. As explained in greater detail below, these
findings are sufficient but unnecessary statistics in support of the
inkblot hypothesis as applied to the federal securities laws. They are
sufficient because if the statute had a clearly discernible meaning it
would not generate 5-4 splits more frequently than other matters
presented to the Court. These statistics are not, however, necessary
for a finding that a statute ig an "inkblot" because even the most
incoherent statute could generate a series of 9-0 decisions if the Court
unanimously agreed on the interpretive principles to be applied to
that otherwise incomprehensible statute.
Part III focuses on problems unique to section 10(b) jurisprudence and identifies seven distinct factors that make section 10(b)
particularly difficult to interpret. These factors reasonably lead the
Court to treat section 10(b) as if it were an inkblot and explain the
unusual incidence of 5-4 'decisions in section 10(b) cases. Part IV
suggests that Central Bank's critics who complain that the decision
does material harm to the integrity of the nation's securities markets
have greatly exaggerated any realistic cause for concern.
Part V concludes with the observation that, while the Supreme
Court's confusion and uncertainty over the interpretation of the
federal securities laws is understandable, it is not desirable. The root
cause of this confusion is, however, a Congress ,that has legislated
ambiguously and then proven itself unable to clarify the ambiguities
it has spawned.29 The Court is thus the victim of Congress's inarticulate locution and not the cause of the confusion. Indeed, if the Court
must continue interpreting the enigmatic section 10(b) implied private
right, the Court can reasonably and prudently extend CentralBank's
narrow, textualist reading of the statute. Such an approach is
preferable to the inkblot game the Court is forced to play whenever
it embarks on a search for meaning that is not there.

29. Legislation currently pending before Congress, if enacted in current form, would

not address the major causes of uncertainty regarding the interpretation of § 10(b). See
H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). For a'
capsule summary of these bills, see ComparisonofSecurities Litigation Reform Bills in the
104th Congress,INSIGHTS, Aug. 1995, at 28.
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DIVIDED COURTS AND UNSTABLE COALITIONS: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE THAT THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
ARE CONSTRUED AS THOUGH THEY ARE INKBLOTS

Suppose we want to test the hypothesis that the federal securities
laws in general, and section 10(b) in particular, are perceived by the
Supreme Court as inkblots-statutory utterances with few clearly
discernible meanings, subject to sharply differing interpretations, and
lacking organizing principles in text or context that provide consistent
or coherent rules of construction. What pattern of Supreme Court
decision-making would we then expect to observe?
It should be sufficient to observe a higher than normal incidence
of sharply split decisions involving the formation of unstable and
unusual coalitions. In the absence of any clear statutory meaning or
intent, the Justices should be expected to split almost randomly over
the images they perceive in the statutory blots.3 The Justices should
also be expected to form coalitions that do not correlate with
coalitions formed in debates involving well-defined issues of principle.
In addition, we should also observe an unusually low incidence of
unanimous decisions as the-Justices find uniform consensus relatively
difficult to achieve.
The Evidence from 5-4 Split Decisions and
Unanimous Decisions
The data are consistent with the inkblot hypothesis. Even on a
Court known for the incidence of 5-4 split opinions, decisions
interpreting the federal securities laws are stunning for the frequency
with which they are decided by the narrowest of margins. Table 1
lists major Supreme Court decisions interpreting the federal securities
laws from 1987 to date.3 It also reports the margins by which the
cases were decided, and describes the composition of the majorities
and minorities in each case. Of the twelve decisions catalogued in
Table 1, seven (58.3%) were decided by a margin of 5-4. One (8.3%)
resulted in an evenly split court. One (8.3%) was decided by a
plurality. One (8.3%) was decided by a unanimous court. The sole
A.

30. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
31. Appendix A describes the construction of Table 1. Votes in several cases can be
counted in a variety of ways but, as explained in notes 35-41, infra, the conclusions
presented in the text are robust with regard to these alternative classifications.
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TABLE 1

Margins and Voting Patterns in Major Supreme Court Decisions
Interpreting the Federal Securities Laws (1987-1995)
DECISION

YEAR

VOTE JUSTICES IN
MAJORITY*

Gustafson v.
Alloyd

1995

5-4

Kennedy, Rehnquist,
Thomas, Scalia,
Stevens, O'Connor Souter Ginsburg, Breyer

Central Bank

1994

5-4

Kennedy, Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas

Stevens, [Blackmun],
Souter, Ginsburg

Mutick Peeler

1993

6-3

Kennedy, Rehnquist,
[White], Stevens, Scalia,
Souter

Thomas, [Blackmun],
O'Connor

LampfPleva

1991

5-4

[Blackmun], Rehnquist,
[White], [Marshall], Scalia

Stevens, Souter,
O'Connor, Kennedy

Gollust v.
Mendell

1991

9-0

Souter, Rehnquist,
[White], Stevens, Scalia,
[Marshall], [Blackmun],
O'Connor, Kennedy

Virginia Bankshares (Causation
under § 14(a))

1990

5-4

Souter, Rehnquist,
[White], O'Connor, Scalia

Kennedy, [Marshall],
[Blackmun], Stevens

Reves v. Ernst &
Young (9 month
provision)

1990

5-4

[Marshall], [Brennan],
[Blackmun], Stevens,
Kennedy

Rehnquist, White,
O'Connor, Scalia

Rodriguez v.
Shearman

1989

5-4

Kennedy, Rehnquist,
[White], O'Connor, Scalia

Stevens, [Brennan],
[Marshall],
[Blackmun]

Pinter v. Dahl

1988

7-1

[Blackmun], Rehnquist,
[Brennan], [White], [Marshall], O'Connor, Scalia

Stevens

Kennedy

Basic v. Levinson

1988

4-2

[Blackmun], [Brennan],
[Marshall], Stevens

[White], O'Connor

Scalia,
Rehnquist,
Kennedy

Shearson v.
McMahon

1987

5-4

O'Connor, Rehnquist,
White, [Powell], Scalia

[Blackmun],
[Brennan], [Marshall],
Stevens

Carpenter(Securities law violation)

1987

4-4

Undisclosed

Undisclosed

JUSTICES IN
MINORITY*

* Justices no longer sitting on the Court are denoted in brackets.

NOT
VOTING
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unanimous decision, Gollust v. Mendell,32 involved the interpretation

of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 31 In sharp
contrast to the vague language of section 10(b), section 16(b) is quite
detailed, and in interpreting section 16(b) the Court has been able to
follow a "literal, 'mechanical' application of the statutory text in
determining who may be subject to liability."' No such literal or
mechanical application is possible for section 10(b).
In the aggregate, nine of the twelve decisions (75.0%) were by

the narrowest of possible margins or by plurality. Only three of
twelve decisions (25.0%) were decided by majorities that could have
lost even one vote and still prevailed as majorities.
These data are remarkable. During the period covered by Table
1-the 1986 through 1994 Terms-21.3% of the Court's decisions
were decided by margins of 5-4.35 In the recently completed 1994

32.
33.
34.
35.

501 U.S. 115 (1991).
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1995).
Gollust, 501 U.S. at 122.
The incidence of 5-4 decisions is as follows:
Term

All Cases

5-4 Cases

%54

1986*

152

47

30.9%

1987*

142

32

22.5%

1988*

143

34

23.8%

1989*

137

42

30.7%

1990*

121

23

19.2%

1991**

114

14

12.3%

1992**

114

18

15.80%

1993**

87

13

14.9%

1994***

82

18

22.0%

TOTAL

1,092

241

21.3%

* These data describe 5-4 decisions as a percentage of cases decided by full opinion
and are as reported in Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the
United States Supreme Court, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 712 Table 1 (1993).
** These data are from the HarvardLaw Review's annual Supreme Court Review and
describe full-opinion decisions disposing of cases on their merits. The Supreme
Court-LeadingCases, 106 HARV. L. REv. 163,380-81 Table I(D) (1992) (1991 Term); 107
HARV. L. REV. 144,374-75 Table I(D) (1993) (1992 Term); 108 HARV. L. REv. 139, 37475 Table I(D) (1994) (1993 Term).
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term, 22.0% of all cases were decided by a margin of 5-4. The peak
frequency of 5-4 decisions was reached in 1986 when 30.9% of all
cases decided by a full opinion were by votes of 5-4.
By this yardstick, 5-4 decisions in cases interpreting the federal
securities laws since 1986 are almost twice as frequent as the peak
incidence of 5-4 decisions in any single term in the history of the
Supreme Court. They are almost three times more frequent than the
incidence of 5-4 decisions in the Court's overall docket since 1986.
This pattern of closely split decision-making is highly significant
in a statistical sense. The probability of drawing seven or more 5-4
decisions from a random sample of twelve Supreme Court opinions
is less than four-tenths of one percent.36 If 4-4 and plurality decisions are counted as 5-4 decisions, then the probability of drawing
nine or more such decisions from a random sample of twelve Supreme

*** The data for the 1994 Term are from Marcia Coyle, An Emboldened Majority
Breaks Ground, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995, at C2; Linda Greenhouse, Gavel Rousers"
Farewellto the Old Orde in the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, § 4, at 1.
36. These probabilities are calculated on the assumption that 20% of Supreme
Court
decisions are not by 5-4 margins and that the binomial distribution applies to the suggested
experiment-that is, that the probability of drawing at least seven 5-4 decisions from a
random sample of Supreme Court decisions of which 20% are decided by 5-4 margins, is
analogous to the probability of drawing from a sequence of binary random, independent,
and identically distributed variables with a distribution identical to that observed in 5-4
Supreme Court decisions from the 1986 through 1994 terms. See generally, MICHAEL 0.
FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 111-15 (1990) (explaining the
derivation and application of the binomial distribution).
The use of the 20% assumption is to approximate the actually observed 21.3%
probability and to conform with generally available statistical tables.
The cumulative probabilities associated with such decisions for a range of
distributional parameters surrounding the observed data are as follows:
Number of 5-4, 4-4, or Plurality
Votes Drawn from a Sample of
Twelve Decisions

Assumed Cumulative Probability
15%

20%

25%

Nine

.0000

.0001

.0004

Eight

.0001

.0006

.0028

Seven

.0007

.0039

.0143

Six

.0046

.0194

.0544

Five

.0239

.0726

.1576

Id. at 542-43 Table B.
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Court opinions is in the range of one-hundredth of one percent. 37
If the cases are construed as generating only five 5-4 opinions out of
twelve, 38 then the probability of drawing five or more such decisions
from a random sample of twelve Supreme Court decisions is
approximately 7.26%. I present this range of statistical estimates
because reasonable minds can differ as to the categorization of
specific votes described in Table 1, and because I have no data
describing the incidence of 4-4 and plurality decisions. The statistics
suggest, however, that no matter how one slices the data, narrow
margins are far more common in cases interpreting the federal
securities laws than in the Court's docket as a whole, and that this
difference is not the result of mere chance.
If the incidence of 5-4 splits is subdivided to distinguish between
cases deciding constitutional issues and cases deciding questions of
statutory construction or of common law, the tendency toward 5-4
splits in cases construing the federal securities laws is all the more
remarkable. A study by Judge Easterbrook suggests that "[c]onstitutional cases produce significantly more disagreement than statutory
cases." 39 He explains this pattern, in part, by suggesting that
"Justices have more discretion in constitutional'than in statutory cases
because of the age and vagueness of the [Constitutional] text."' If
the pattern found by Judge Easterbrook continues to hold true
beyond his sample period, 'then the securities laws are all the more
remarkable because they appear to have achieved a level of vagueness
more comparable to questions of constitutional construction than to
questions of statutory interpretation.
Moreover, if the inkblot hypothesis is correct as applied to the
federal securities laws, then we should also observe a lower than
normal incidence of unanimous decisions in cases interpreting the
federal securities statutes. In the nine terms spanning 1986-1987
through 1994-1995, an average of approximately 37.1% of all decisions

37. Id. This estimate is not exact because it does not adjust sample statistics to
account for the aggregate incidence of 4-4 aid plurality decisions, but such decisions are
relatively rare and are not likely to change the closest estimate of cumulative probability
incidence from 20%. Even if the cumulative probability increased to 25%, the probability
of drawing nine of twelve such cases would be only four-hundredths of one percent.
38. This count results if Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991),
and Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), are construed as not being 5-4 decisions.
39. Frank H. Easterbrook, Agreement Among the Justices: An Empirical Note, 1984
Sup. Cr. REv. 389, 392.
40. 1& at 391.
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41
were by a unanimous court, with or without separate concurrences.
During the same period, only one of twelve-8.3%-of the decisions
interpreting the federal securities statutes was unanimous. The
probability of there being only one such decision of twelve in a
population containing 35% unanimous decisions is less than one-half
of one percent.42 The relatively rare incidence of unanimous
decisions interpreting the federal securities laws provides further
support for the inkblot hypothesis.

B. The Evidence from Unusual and Unstable CoalitionalPatterns
As would be expected when voting on the meaning of inkblots,
close decisions interpreting the federal securities laws are often the
result of unusual and unstable coalitions. Consider, for example, the
four Justices in the Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. dissent.43 Justices Scalia
and Thomas are most frequently viewed as the "right wing" of the
Court 4 Justices Ginsburg and Breyer are often viewed as leaning
toward the Court's "left wing."'45 It is difficult to conceive of a
general or coherent judicial or political philosophy that would draw
these four Justices as natural adherents. Indeed, during the 1994
term, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were least likely to agree with
Justice Thomas, the author of the Gustafson dissent in which they
joined.' No other decision in the 1994 term drew Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer as members of the minority.47 Such
an unlikely coalition is most easily formed when there is no clear
principle at stake. The lack of a clear principle at stake is a characteristic common to the interpretation of inkblots.'8
Longer-term voting patterns by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
Souter, and Stevens reinforce the same point. Justice Kennedy
authored the majority opinions in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.

41. Coyle, supra note 35, reports that a total of 405 decisions from the 1986 through
1994 terms were by unanimous courts, either with or without concurrences. Over the same
period, the Court decided 1092 cases. See supra note 35. Thus, 37.1% of all decisions
during that period were by 9-0 votes.
42. See, e.g., FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 36.
43. 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1064 (1995).
44. Greenhouse, supra note 35, at 1.
45. Id. at 1, 4; Coyle, supra note 35, at C3.
46. Coyle, supra note 35, at C2.
47. Id.
48. See EXNER, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that the inkblot's lack of psychometric
principles has exasperated psychological researchers).
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Employers Ins. of Wassau,49 Central Bank, and Gustafson, the three
most recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the federal
Justice Kennedy's decisions in Gustafson and
securities laws5
Central Bank limit the scope of plaintiffs' ability to prevail in
securities fraud actions.51 Those decisions have been criticized as
overly crabbed and narrow interpretations of the federal securities
laws. 2 Yet, in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v.
Gilbertson" and Virginia Bankshares, Ina v. Sandberg, Justice
Kennedy wrote for minorities supporting more expansive, pro-plaintiff
interpretations of the federal securities laws.'
Justice Kennedy's
critics would do well to, remember that the Justice they criticize for
limiting plaintiffs' rights in Gustafson and Central Bank is also the
Justice they should applaud for trying to protect plaintiffs' rights in
Lampf Pleva and Virginia Bankshares.
Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Souter also appear inconsistently
among members of the majority and minority in recent securities law
cases.5 6 As shown in Table 1, while Justice O'Connor was in the
49. 113 S.Ct. 2085 (1993).
50. See supra Table 1.
51. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct: 1061 (1995); Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
52. See, e.g., Gustafson, 115, S. Ct. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice
Kennedy's narrow interpretation of §.12(2)); Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central
Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429, 1431-33 (1994) (criticizing Justice Kennedy's interpretation of
§ 10(b) as a legal fiction).
53. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
54. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
55. Lampf, Pleva, 501 U.S. at 374-78 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's adoption of a limited three-year period of repose for SEC § 10(b) actions and
stating that § 10(b) violations commonly go undiscovered for long periods of time);
Virginia Bankshares,501 U.S. at 1114-16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
standard of proof for nonvoting causation in § 14(a) actions as too limiting). Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion in Musick, Peeleris more difficult to categorize. That opinion
contains elements reinforcing the Court's earlier expansive approach to interpreting the
securities laws, although plaintiffs might actually prefer a rule that prohibits contribution
because such a rule could be used to increase settlement pressure on more solvent
defendants. See Roberts, supra note 21, at 1262; see also Richard L. Jacobson, Shining a
Lampf on Section 10(b) Limitations Periods, INSIGHTS, Mar. 1992, at 12 (asserting that
Justice Kennedy criticized the standard for § 10(b) claims set forth in Lampf, Pleva
because it was "unreasonably short" and made § 10(b) useless to injured investors); S.
Scott Luton, The Ebb and Flow of Section 10(b) Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Central
Bank, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK LJ. 45, 46 n.2 (1994) (stating that Justice Kennedy's
approach in Central Bank was more restrictive than in Virginia Bankshares).
56. Carrying the analysis back farther in time with regard to coalition formation on
the current Court becomes problematic because at least four of the then-sitting Justices
from earlier cases no longer serve on the Court.
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majority in Gustafson, CentralBank, and VirginiaBankshares,she was
in the minority in Reves v. Ernst & Young," Musick, Peeler, and
Lampf Pleva.58 Justice Stevens was in the majority in Gustafson,
Musick, Peeler, and Reves, but found himself in the Central Bank,
Lampf Pleva, and Virginia Bankshares minorities.s9 Justice Souter
was in the Gustafson, Musick, Peeler, and Virginia Bankshares
majorities, but in the Central Bank and Lampf Pleva minorities.'
The track records of Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer appear
too short to troll for patterns.
The only meaningful regularity appears to emanate from the
Chief Justice and Justice Scalia. Chief Justice Rehnquist has been in
the majority in every case in which he has participated except
Reves.6" The Chief Justice's batting average in those cases, nine
majorities out of ten, is a stunning 90.0%. Justice Scalia has also been
a consistent member of Court majorities, missing out on only two of
the ten cases in which his vote is reported-Gustafsonand Reves.
Justice Scalia's batting average in these cases is a healthy 80.0%. This
high correlation between the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia is
consistent with broader voting patterns.62
What are we to make of these generally chaotic coalitional
patterns? At one level, this sort of coalitional analysis is simply too
reductionist to support an inference regarding the interpretive
philosophy of any individual member of the Court, with the possible
exception of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, who display a high
regularity in voting patterns.63 Indeed, closer examination of
individual Justice's rationales in deciding specific cases can discern
logical patterns of statutory construction over time.' From these
57. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
58. See supra Table 1.
59. See supra Table 1.
60. See supra Table 1.
61. See supra Table 1.
62. See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 35, at C2 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist is most
likely to agree with Justice Scalia in civil cases).
63. For a critique of textualist approaches often associated with Justice Scalia, see
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 749 (1995).
64. For example, Justice Kennedy's opinions in Gustafson, Central Bank, Musick,
Peeler, Lampf, Pleva, and Virginia Bankshares generally display a two-step approach to
the interpretation of the federal securities laws. First, Justice Kennedy considers evidence
that the language or history of the statute supports a particular interpretation, or that such
interpretation is necessary for the practical effectuation of the statute. If this analysis
suggests that a right should be implied or that a particular interpretation should be
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patterns it is possible to argue that the federal securities laws have a
consistent but individualized meaning to many of the Justices.
However, these individualized interpretations tend neither to cohere,
nor to persuade, to the extent of forming stable blocks capable of
drawing more than two Justices with any regularity.
Accordingly, individual Justices may well possess fully formed
and internally consistent approaches to the interpretation of the
federal securities laws, but these individual approaches are like private
languages that are not broadly shared by other members of the Court.
When the Court operates as a collective body forced to resolve
questions of statutory interpretation involving the federal securities
laws, the result is a curious and inconsistent series of coalitions that
suggest no clear, collectively shared meaning in the statute at all.65
III. THE PATH

FROM STATUTE TO INKBLOT: REASONS WHY
SECTION 10(B), IN PARTICULAR, IS INTERPRETED
As THOUGH IT IS A BLOT

The observation that Supreme Court voting patterns are
consistent with the inkblot hypothesis is buttressed by historical
analysis of the section 10(b) implied private right of action. The
history of the Court's interpretation of section 10(b) is replete with
curiosities and contradictions, and there are at least seven distinct
factors that contribute to legitimate confusion over the statute's
meaning. These factors provide good reason for the statute to be
perceived as a blot.
First, when Congress enacted section 10(b), it did not anticipate
that it was creating a private remedy.' The statutory language and

adopted, then Justice Kennedy "triangulates" to find the statutory provision or principle
clearly established in the law that most closely resembles the provision created. No doubt,
other Justices following the same formula can-and do-reach different conclusions, but
Justice Kennedy cannot fairly be accused of being intentionally inconsistent in his
approach to the interpretation of federal securities laws.
65. This result is akin to a cyclic voting pattern in which each voter has a rational and
consistent set of preferences which, when aggregated through a majority voting rule, gives
rise to seemingly irrational or indecisive outcomes. For an example of such cycling in a
legislative context, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 8, at 34-38; see also KENNETH J. ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press (1973) (1951))
(exploring whether it is possible to create a method for "passing from individual to
collective tastes").
66. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 ("Section 10(b) does not by its
terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that
Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a remedy.")
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legislative history are therefore totally silent as to the contours of the
private right.67 Intentionalist analysis runs headlong into the
problem that there is no intent to analyze when it comes to discerning
the contours of the section 10(b) implied private right of action. This
is not a small problem.
Second, section 10(b) is not self-executing.' It is a delegation
of authority to the SEC.69 Rule 10b-5 is an exercise of that delegated authority.7" At no time in the adoption of rule 10b-5 did the
Commission consider the possibility that it was aiding and abetting the
creation of a private right of action.7 The record is instead crystal
clear that the Commission adopted rule 10b-5 for reasons wholly
unrelated to any desire to create an implied private right of action.72
No doubt, the Commission has subsequently urged the broadest
possible interpretation of the implied private right that it never
intended to create in the first instance.73 Those efforts, however,
have been uniformly rejected by the Supreme Court as ultra vires
interpretations of the delegated statutory authority.74 The Court's
tendency to reject the Commission's expansionary interpretations of
section 10(b) also predates by many years its perceived recent shift to
post-Chevron75 textualism 76 Intentionalists advocating a broad construction of the implied private right therefore cannot even find
support in the original intent of the agency that adopted the regulation at issue. They must instead wrestle with a substantial body of
precedent suggesting that the agency has a tendency to construe its
authority under section 10(b) far too generously.
Third, while the Supreme Court states that the section 10(b)
implied private right is "beyond peradventure,"' the Court has

(citations omitted).
67. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934).
68. Ernst & Ernst,425 U.S. at 213-14.
69. Id.
70. ld. at 195.
71. For a description of the considerations that led the Commission to adopt rule 10b5, see Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission'sAuthority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 964, 979-81 (1994).
72. Ernst & Ernst,425 U.S. at 196.
73. Id. at 198; see also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 1447
(1994).
74. 9 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4332-38 (3d ed. 1989).
75. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
76. See, e.g. Pierce supra note 63.
77. Herman & MaeClean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
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never explained why the right exists. Absent an articulated rationale
for the existence of such an implied private right, it is trivially easy to
argue about the ultimate reach of the unexplained cause of action.
Fourth, while the lower courts have articulated a variety of
rationales in support of an implied private 10(b) right of action,' the
Court has explicitly rejected each of those rationales. 79 Lower court
decisions therefore provide no contemporaneously useful analytic
guidance regarding the theoretical foundation for section 10(b)'s
implied right. The implied section 10(b) private right of action seems
to float without foundation in the intellectual air.
Fifth, in the almost fifty years since the implied section 10(b)
private right was initially recognized," the doctrine governing the
implication of private rights has been radically transformed."1 The
emphasis now is on whether Congress intended to create an implied
private right, and we already know that Congress never expressed
such an intention. Therefore, if the question were to arise on a clean
slate, it is improbable in the extreme that the Court today would
imply the section 10(b) private right."
Sixth, Congress has remained silent as to the scope of the section
10(b) implied private right. Silence begets confusion. Those who
support the implied section 10(b) private right interpret silence as
acquiescence. Others draw no inference from the silence, recognizing
that inaction can be a symptom of failure to agree on an alternative
rather than a sign of support for the status quo.' In any event, the
debate over the implications of congressional inaction regarding
section 10(b) underscores the difficulty in drawing any inference from
congressional inaction regarding the interpretation of any statute.
Seventh, congressional intent is far from stable over time. The
interpretation of section 10(b) that would be supported by today's
Republican-dominated Congress is likely quite different from the
interpretation that would have been supported by last year's or last

78. See Grundfest, supra note 71, at 985-88.
79. Id. at 988-91.
80. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196 n.16 (citing Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)).
81. See, e.g., CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Our approach
to implied causes of action, as to other matters of statutory construction, has changed
markedly since the Exchange Act's passage in 1934."). See also supra note 28; Maynard,
supra note 6, at 4 n.19.
82. See Grundfest, supra note 71, at 986-89.
83. CentralBank, 114 S.Ct. at 1442.
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decade's Democrat-dominated Congress. Intentionalists thus confront
the uncomfortable problem that, if they look to the intent of the
Congress that in 1934 enacted section 10(b) they find no guidance, but
if they look to the intent of subsequent Congresses they can infer
sharply conflicting guidance depending on where their intentionalist
time machines stop along the way.
In sum, the implied section 10(b) private right was never
intended at inception by Congress or by the Commission, has never
been explained by the Supreme Court, has no currently viable
explanation in any Supreme Court or lower court opinion, would
probably not exist if presented to the Court on a clean slate, has not
been clarified by congressional action subsequent to 1934, and would
likely be subject to differing interpretations by subsequent Congresses.
The implied section 10(b) private right of action thus exists as an
unexplained and inexplicable anachronism-a vestige of an earlier era
in which private rights were more easily implied, but even then not so
easily defined or explained.
All of these factors contribute to honest and legitimate confusion
over the meaning of the statute and uncertainty over the outer limits
of the implied private right's reach. All of these factors also make it
reasonable for the Court to perceive section 10(b) as though it is an
inkblot that lacks clear, inherent meaning. The high incidence of split
-decisions and of unstable coalitions exist for good reason and not out
of lack of care, obstinacy, or contrariness on the part of the Court.
IV.

CENTRAL BANK'S PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS OVERSTATED

The controversy engendered by CentralBank's narrow interpretation of the section 10(b) inkblot is all the more remarkable for the
predictions of doom that followed in the opinion's wake.' The
suggestion that fraudsters would celebrate Central Bank as a license
to pillage and plunder is exaggerated for several reasons.
First, as the Court itself explained:
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not
mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are
always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any
person... may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5,
assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under

84. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
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Rule 10b-5 are met. In any complex securities fraud,
moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators.'
Courts historically have paid scant attention to the distinction between
primary and secondary liability under section 10(b) because little
hinged on that categorization. 6 Now, however, that the distinction
is critical, the courts are finding that much conduct that had traditionally been denominated as aiding and abetting can also be prosecuted
as a primary violation.' Real "bad guys" therefore find no comfort
in Central Bank because they are now successfully prosecuted as
primary violators. The only defendants who may now find that they
are immune from section 10(b) liability-but not necessarily from
liability under state law-are the remote, fringe participants in, or
bystanders to, a securities fraud. Eliminating those defendants from
the process is unlikely to threaten the core values of the federal
securities laws.
Second, even if Central Bank's holding is extended to preclude
aiding and abetting prosecutions by the SEC,' the Commission has
available to it a rich arsenal of alternative enforcement tools that it
can use to reach wrongdoers who are not primary violators of section
10(b). 9 The Commission has said as much,' and Central Bank will
85. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455 (citations omitted).
86. Edward Brodsky, Aiding and Abetting Claims Under Rule lob-5, N.Y. LJ., June
14, 1995, at 3.
87. Id.
88. For an excellent description of the debate over whether CentralBank can, should,
or already has been extended to preclude Commission enforcement actions alleging aiding
and abetting, see Edward C. Brewer, III & John L. Latham, SEC v. Central Bank: A
Draft Opinionfor the Court's Conference, 50 Bus. LAW 19 (1994) (responding to Lorne,
infra, and describing an argument that the Supreme Court could rely upon to extend its
Central Bank holding to preclude Commission enforcement proceedings under § 10(b));
Simon M. Lorne, Central Bank of Denver v. SEC, 49 Bus. LAW. 1467 (1994) (describing
an alternative argument that the Supreme Court could rely upon to limit its Central Bank
holding to private implied rights). A recent decision held that Central Bank does, in fact,
preclude SEC enforcement proceedings alleging aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b).
SEC v. United States Envtl., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 6608, (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 13, 1994). The
same question is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Fehn, No. 94-16136
(9th Cir. filed May 6, 1994).
89. See, e.g., Bettina M. Lawton & Catherine Botticelli, New Weapon in the SEC's
Arsenal, Bus. L. TODAY, July-Aug. 1995, at 34, 35-36 (discussing § 21C of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which allows the SEC to "obtain a cease-and-desist order against
... 'any ... person that is, was, or would be a cause of [a] violation, due to an act or
omission the person knew or should have known would contribute to"' a breach of rule
10b-5) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (1994)).
90. Abandonment of the Private Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting Securities
Fraud: Staff Report on Private Securities Litigation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1994)

60

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol., 29:41

therefore steal little thunder from the Commission's ongoing
campaign to stamp out fraud in the securities markets.
V.

CONCLUSION

We are thus left with much wailing and wearing of sackcloth over
a Supreme Court opinion whose holding will have little material effect
on the future course of securities law enforcement. The theories of
some prosecutions may change, but the practical outcome of many
cases will likely not be affected.
So what's the big deal? The big deal is that in Central Bank a
majority of the Supreme Court adopted a strict-textualist approach to
section 10(b). To supporters of a broad, expansionary interpretation
of the implied section 10(b) private right of action, this mode of
analysis sounds a death knell for anything but the narrowest statutory
interpretations that can be directly supported by the statutory
language. To these observers, the real danger in CentralBank is not
the holding in that case, but the holding that might result from the
next decision rendered pursuant to CentralBank's logic.
But what are the alternatives? Should the Court set out to
speculate over an intention that we knew was never even contemplated by Congress?. If so, from where should the Court obtain its
guidance? Or, should the Court simply conclude that section 10(b)'s
reach is unconstrained and thus expand the statute as far as possible
on the theory that no fraud is a good fraud? Such an expansion of
liability would, however, run roughshod over the explicit statutory
provisions contained in the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act that establish a host of due diligence and other defenses to
liability under the federal securities laws.
Indeed, Professor Eisenberg's preferred policy-based rationale for
deciding Central Bank stands as a valuable illustration of the
intractable problems that arise once a court abandons a narrow
interpretation of section 10(b), whether that interpretation is rooted
in strict textualism or in some other interpretative doctrine.9 Under
Professor Eisenberg's proposed decision rule, the Court would
consider empirical data describing the various costs and benefits
generated by a rule that imposes aiding-and-abetting liability under

(statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
91. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 20-22.
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section 10(b).' The result of this policy-based analysis would be
historically contingent and subject to vehement debate. In particular,
the answer to the question, "is there aiding-and-abetting liability for
violations of section 10(b)?" would depend on the data available at
the time the question is asked, the Court's subjective evaluation of
those data, and the Court's subjective balancing of the costs and
benefits suggested by those data. All of this overt legislating from the
bench would, moreover, be justified in the name of potentially
expanding a cause of action that neither Congress nor the Commission contemplated creating in the first instance.
No doubt, strict textualism suffers from a host of serious flaws,
but so does every rule for interpreting a statute that presents itself as
an inkblot. In order to avoid these intractable interpretive difficulties,
the best the Court can do is adopt an avowedly narrow interpretive
approach which gives section 10(b) the minimally necessary scope
required for its practical existence as an implied private right of
action. This result can be achieved through a wide variety of analytic
techniques, of which strict textualism is but one.
My argument for narrow construction of section 10(b) is thus
pragmatic at heart. Once the Court abandons a narrow construction
of the statute, it is without any objective guidance as to how far it
should stretch in defining the scope of the implied section 10(b)
private remedy. Moreover, by reading section 10(b) narrowly, the
Court will be doing its best to satisfy its obligation to act as a faithful
servant of a Congress that never even created the cause of action that
the Court is forced to interpret.
Clearly, a better answer is to obtain: from Congress a precise and
well-crafted articulation of the contours of the section 10(b) private
right of action. Absent such legislative guidance, however, a stricttextualist approach may present the best, although imperfect, hope for
consistency and predictability in Supreme Court securities law jurisprudence. Courts do not belong in the inkblot business. A stricttextualist approach may, for all its flaws, be the best available
organizing principle for a rule of narrow construction that can end the
string of sharply divided securities law decisions recently emanating
from the Supreme Court.

92. Id.
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APPENDIX A

Margins And Voting Patternsin Major Supreme Court Decisions
InterpretingThe FederalSecurities Laws (19 8 7 -199 5)t
Table 1 excludes from consideration cases relating to, but not
interpreting, the federal securities laws. For example, Mastrobuono
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. deals with a securities arbitration
matter but turns on questions relating to choice of law issues and to
the interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act.95 Likewise, Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc9 6 deals with the constitutionality of section

27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),' but
turns on the application of separation of powers principles.9' Such
cases are properly excluded from an analysis of Supreme Court
decisions construing the federal securities laws.
In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.99 the Court ruled 5-4 that a buyer's
right of rescission under section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act (1933
Act) does not extend to private agreements for the sale of securities." ° The section 12(2) cause of action gives buyers the right of
rescission against securities sellers who make material misstatements
or omissions via a "prospectus." 10 1 Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, and Souter, found that the overall structure of the 1933
Act and its legislative history showed that Congress intended the term
"prospectus" to refer only to the offering of securities by an issuer or
controlling shareholder to the general public.1" The majority
concluded that the section 12(2) cause of action did not reach private
agreements for the sale of securities. 3 Justice Thomas, in a dissent
joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that the 1933
Act used two distinct definitions of the term "prospectus,"'" the

t Prepared by Hugh Miller, student at Stanford Law School.
94. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
95. Id. at 1213-14.

96. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
97. ld. at 1449.
98. Id.
99. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1073-74.
1065-66 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1995)).
1069-70.
1073-74.
1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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broadest definition supporting a section 12(2) cause of action
involving private securities transactions.0 5 In a separate dissent,
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, adduced further textual
and historical support for Justice Thomas's interpretation and
approvingly reviewed scholarly and lower court authority for the
proposition that section 12(2) applies to private sales of securities."
In Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank"7 the Court ruled 5-4
that there is no implied private right of action for aiding and abetting
a Violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.' 8 Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion stated that the text of the 1934 Act did not reach
aiding-and-abetting liability for section 10(b) violations.' 9 Moreover, Congress chose not to impose such liability for any of the
expressly created private causes of action in the Act."' The majority thus inferred that Congress did not intend to attach liability to
aiding and abetting since' it did not explicitly provide for a private
section 10(b) cause of action"' and therefore declined to extend
such liability to the implied private cause of action created by lower
courts.'1 2 Justice Stevens's dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Souter, and Ginsburg, argued that the Court should follow administrative and lower court precedent implying a private section 10(b) cause
of action for aiding and abetting because this would be consistent with
the broad remedial purposes of the 1934 Act. 13 The dissent also
suggested that Congress's failure to amend section 10(b) in light of
this precedent implies legislative assent to the existence of a private
114
cause of action for aiding and abetting.
In Musick, Peeler & Garrettv. Employers Ins. of Wassau"5 the
Court held 6-3 that defendants have an implied right to seek
contribution from joint tortfeasors in a cause of action governed by
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder." 6 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion observed that
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1081-83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
IU. at 1455.
1d at 1448.
Id. at 1449.
Id. at 1448.
Id.
Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1458 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
Id. at 2092.
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Congress declared rights of contribution in two sections of the 1934
Act-sections 9 and 18-that expressly define private causes of
action." 7 Since these two sections are similar both in structure and
purpose to section 10(b),"' the majority concluded that consistency
and coherence with the overall structure and purpose of the 1934 Act
imply a right to contribution attaching to the private cause of action
established by the judiciary under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.119
In a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, Justice
Thomas argued against a right to contribution on the ground that
Congress could have expressly provided for such a right, either in the
original 1934 Act or in a subsequent amendment, but has chosen not
to do so. 2 ' Absent a clear declaration of legislative intent, Thomas
opined that the Court should decline to extend protection to joint
tortfeasors under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 because 21 such
tortfeasors are not the intended beneficiaries of the 1934 Act.
In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson'22
the Court ruled 5-4 that the statute of limitations for section 10(b)
violations under the 1934 Act bars any claim not filed within one year
after a violation's discovery and within three years of the violation's
occurrence.'12
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion noted that
Congress created a one-year discovery period and three-year period
of repose for the express causes of action defined under sections 9(e)
and 18(c), and a one-year discovery period coupled with a two-year
period of repose for actions defined under section 16(b).12 4 Furthermore, the majority found that the special focus of section 16(b)"z
contrasted with the broad remedial purposes shared by sections 9(e),
10(b), and 18(c) of the 1934 Act.12 6 It thus concluded that the
implied cause of action under section 10(b) should have the same oneand three-year time limitations that Congress established for the
127
express causes of action defined under sections 9(e) and 18(C).
Justice Scalia concurred, suggesting that absent a congressionally
117.
118.
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Id. at 2090-91.
Id. at 2090.
Id. at 2091.
Id. at 2095 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2094-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 364.
Id. at 360 nn.5-6.
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legislated time limit, state statutes of limitation should control unless
they conflict with the purpose of the federal statute, in which case no
time limit will exist." Since the Court took the regrettable step of
creating a private section 10(b) cause of action by judicial fiat, Scalia
reasoned that the most responsible way to manage the consequences
was to use the time limitation of an analogous cause of action.129
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justice Souter, advocated
the Court's endorsement of existing precedents which borrowed state
statutes of limitations for private section 10(b) actions.3 Justice
O'Connor also filed a dissent joined by Justice Kennedy arguing that,
given lower court precedent and retroactivity considerations, fairness
mandated the use of state statutes of limitation for all section 10(b)
causes of action initiated prior to the ruling in the case.13 ' Justice
Kennedy's dissent, joined by Justice O'Connor, accepted the one-year
discovery period but rejected a three-year period of repose as
contrary to the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act.'32
In Gollust v. Mendell,' its sole unanimous securities decision,
the Court held that securities holders have standing under section
16(b) of the 1934 Act as long as they held those securities at the time
their suit was instituted. The plaintiff owned shares of Viacom
International, Inc. (Viacom) and, in 1987, brought a derivative action
under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act."M That section imposes strict
liability on owners of more than ten percent of a corporation's listed
stock for "short swing" trading. 3 Arsenal Acquiring Corporation
subsequently acquired Viacom, and the holders of Viacom's stock
received shares in the acquiring company. After this transaction, the
plaintiff no longer held shares in Viacom." 6
The issue presented was whether standing existed under section
16(b).137 The Court first stated that because section 16(b) "imposes
'liability without fault within its narrowly drawn limits,' [the Court
has] been reluctant to exceed a literal, 'mechanical' application of the

128.
129.
130.
131.
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133.
134.
135.
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137.

Id. at 364 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 365-66 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 368 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 373-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 374 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
501 U.S. 115 (1991).
Id. at 118.
Id.
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statutory text.,138 The Court, however, had "no difficulty conclud-

ing that, in the enactment of § 16(b), Congress understood and
intended that, throughout the period of his participation, a plaintiff
authorized to sue insiders on behalf of an issuer would have some
continuing financial interest in the outcome of the litigation."'39
The Court, however, found that this financial stake is "maintained
when the plaintiff's interest in the issuer has been replaced by one in
the issuer's new parent.""
The Court therefore held that the
plaintiff had "satisfied the statutes's requirements [since] [h]e owned
a 'security' of the 'issuer' at the time he 'instituted' [the] § 16(b)
action.''.
In Virginia Bankshares,Inc. v. Sandberg,142 the Court ruled 8-1

that knowingly false statements of opinion or beliefs made by
corporate directors for the purpose of soliciting proxies, even though
conclusory in form, may be actionable as misstatements of material43
facts under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and SEC rule 14a-9.1
The Court further held by a 5-4 vote that minority shareholders who
collectively lack the votes necessary to defeat a planned corporate
merger advocated by majority shareholders cannot prove the required
element of causation under an alleged section 14(a) violation. 44 On
the latter issue Justice Souter, writing for the majority, argued that
congressional silence concerning the proper scope of the judicially
implied right of private action under section 14(b) posed a serious
obstacle to expanding its protection to include claims where minority
shareholders lack votes necessary to defeat 1a 45majority-endorsed plan
promoted via a misleading proxy statement.
In a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens argued
that materially false statements in proxy materials are actionable
under section 14(a) and that no additional element of causation
should be imposed."4 In a separate dissent joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, Justice Kennedy advocated
relaxation of the majority's standard of proof for causation to permit

138.
139.
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lIdat 122.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 126-27.
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Id. at 1106-08.
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recovery in cases where, but for misleading proxy statements, majority
shareholders might have voted with the interests of a dissenting but
powerless minority, or where the board of directors or majority
shareholder
has breached a fiduciary duty to the minority sharehold14 7
ers.
In Reves v. Ernst & Young" the Court ruled 5-4 that demand
notes offered by a business organization to finance its general
operations are "securities" within the meaning of section 3(a)(10) of
the 1934 Act. 49 Justice Marshall's majority opinion adopted the
Second Circuit's four-point '-family resemblance" test to rebut a
presumption that any note with a term of more than nine months is
a "security" for purposes of the 1934 Act, placing the note within a
list of judicially created exemptions.5
The majority further declared that notes payable on demand have a maturity exceeding the
1934 Act's statutory exemption for notes with terms not longer than
nine months.'
In a separate concurrence, Justice Stevens agreed with the
dissenters that demand notes have a maturity of less than nine months
but argued that legislative history indicates that the 1934 Act's
statutory exemption applies only to "commercial paper," and not to
notes drafted as financial investments.5 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia, filed a separate
53
opinion concurring with the use of the "family resemblance" test
but dissenting on the ground that demand notes have immediate
maturity and should fall within the 1934 Act's statutory exemption.Im
5 the Court,
In Rodriguez v. Shearson/American Express Inc."
by a 5-4 vote, held that predispute agreements to arbitrate claims
under the Securities Act of 1933 are enforceable and resolution of
claims in a judicial forum is not required.'56 Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion overruled the Court's prior holding in Wilko v.
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Id. at 1116 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
494 U.S. 56 (1990).
d. at 70.
Id. at 63-65.
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Id. at 73-74 (Stevens, J.,
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Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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490 U.S. 477 (1989).

d.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

68

[Vol. 29:41

Swan157 that arbitration agreements violated the 1933 Act's section
14 prohibition on "waiving compliance with any provision" of the
Act. 5 ' The majority premised its decision on the Court's prior
finding in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon'59 that claims
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act could be arbitrated under
predispute arbitration agreements.' 60 Following the McMahon
pattern of reasoning, the majority distinguished the substantive nonwaivable rights conferred by the 1934 Act from procedural rights not
subject to the 1933 Act's section 14 prohibition against waiver161
The majority found that the right to select the judicial forum and the
wider choice of courts are not essential procedural protections of the
1933 Act and may be waived under a predispute arbitration agreement. 6 A dissenting Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, observed that Congress has declined to
amend the 1933 Act in light of the Wilko precedent and argued that
stare decisis considerations should have precluded its renunciation. 63
In Pinter v. Dahl"6 the Court ruled by 7-1 vote that a commonlaw in pari delicto defense is available for defendants in a private
section 12(2) cause of action under the Securities Act of 1933.165
The Court further held that a person who gratuitously promotes
unregistered securities does not incur "seller" liability under section
12(1) of the Securities Act. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
declared that the in pari delicto defense, previously established for
section 10(b) violations of the 1934 Act in Bateman Eichler, Hill,
Richards, Inc. v. Berner,"6 applies to any private cause of action
under the federal securities laws. 67 The majority also held that the
term "seller" under section 12(1) of the 1933 Act did not apply to a
nonowner party who substantially causes a sales transaction, but who
gratuitously solicits the purchase without any desire to serve his or her
own financial interests or the interests of the securities owner.168
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 482-86.
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Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion accepted the majority's
ruling on the availability of the in par!delicto defense but disputed its
application to the facts of the instant case. 69 Stevens also objected
to the majority's discussion of "seller" in a contribution suit context
as both misleading and merely advisory, the legal issue concerned not
contribution among joint tortfeasors, but assignment of seller's
liability to an investor facilitating transactions between a securities
owner and third party purchasers."' Justice Kennedy took no part
in this case."'

In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson7 ' the Court ruled 6-0 that the

standard for materially false or misleading statements in a section
10(b) action under the 1934 Act depends upon "the significance the
reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented
information."' 7 The Court also held by a 4-2 margin that the
dissemination of materially false or misleading company information
to the marketplace creates a rebuttable presumption of reliance on
the part of stockholders. 4
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, declared that the
appropriate measure of materiality for actions involving section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act is the "reasonable investor" standard established in
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc)75 for section 14(a) of the
same Act. 7 6 The majority further stated that requiring each member
of a plaintiff class to prove individual reliance upon misinformation
would place an impracticable and unfair burden upon a section 10(b)
action.'77 Disseminating misinformation to the marketplace creates
a rebuttable presumption of investor reliance for purposes of section
10(b). This presumption coheres with the legislative history and
Justice White, joined by Justice
purpose of the 1934 Act. 7
O'Connor, filed a separate opinion concurring with the materiality
standard while criticizing the holding that injection of material
misinformation into the marketplace creates a presumption of investor
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reliance. 9 Justice White argued that the legislative history of the
1934 Act weighed against the majority's "fraud-on-the-market" theory
of investor reliance because Congress rejected a similar proposal. 8
He argued further that the "fraud-on-the-market" theory conflicted
with the 1934 Act's goal of promoting disclosure by rewarding
investors who refuse to read or rely on such disclosures. 8' Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy took no part in
this case.'2
In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon" the Court,
by a 5-4 vote, ruled that claims under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
were arbitrable under predispute arbitration agreements. 1 4 The
Court unanimously held that a claim under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act must be arbitrated in accordance with
the terms of a predispute agreement.'5 Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, stated that congressional intent to mandate a judicial
forum for the resolution of section 10(b) claims cannot be inferred
from section 29(a) of the 1934 Act prohibiting waiver of "compliance
with any provision" of the Act. 86 Justice O'Connor reasoned that
section 29(a) merely barred waiver of the "substantive" duties secured
by the Act.'" As such, section 29(a) does not preclude waiver of
the section 27 provision conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction for
claims brought under section 10(b) because section 27 does not
impose any duty with which securities traders must "comply."'"
Justice O'Connor distinguished the Court's prior decision in
Wilko v. Swan,'89 holding that claims arising under the Securities
Act of 1933 with similar antiwaiver and jurisdictional provisions were
not subject to arbitration agreements, on the ground that Wilko must
be read as barring waiver only when arbitration inadequately
safeguards substantive duties conferred by the Act."l
Justice
O'Connor also concluded that subsequent legislative history does not
179.
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181.
182.
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reflect congressional intent to bar enforcement of all predispute
arbitration agreements under section 29(a). 91 Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented from the
majority's holding on these issues.' 92
According to Justice
Blackmun, the majority's statutory interpretation of "compliance"
implies the surprising result that the "literal language of § 29(a) does
not apply to an investor's waiver of his own action."' 93 Justice
Blackmun felt that the Court's earlier holding in Wilko that "the
express language, legislative history, and purposes of the Securities
Act [of 1933] all made predispute agreements to arbitrate section
12(2) claims unenforceable"'' exceptions to the Arbitration Act of
1925.19'
Justice Blackmun asserted that the majority's holding
effectively overruled Wilko but found that the legislative history cited
by Justice O'Connor supported the conclusion that Congress
acquiesced in the Wilko perspective. 96 In a separate opinion,
Justice Stevens also dissented on this issue. Justice Stevens cited
circuit court precedents extending the Wilko holding to claims brought
under the Securities Exchange Act and appealed to stare decisis
considerations.'"
In Carpenter v. United States.9 an evenly divided Court left
standing a lower court conviction under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
by a vote of 4-4'9 and unanimously upheld mail and wire fraud
convictions arising from the same conduct."°° Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, reciting the lower court's reasoning on
the section 10(b) violation: Petitioners were involved in a scheme to
make advance use of proprietary information, slated for publication
in a Wall Street Journalinvestment column, to buy and sell securities
at a profit.20 ' This advance use of proprietary information was a
deliberate breach of a confidentiality duty owed by one scheme
member who was employed by the Journaly° The other scheme
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 238.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 253 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 254 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Ied at 247 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 268-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
484 U.S. 19 (1987).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 23-24.

72

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:41

members used this information to make profitable trades in light of
the expected impact that dissemination of the information would have
on the marketplace after publication and split the proceeds with the
Journal employee.0 3 The lower court held with respect to the
section 10(b) charges that the breach of confidentiality was a fraud
and deception on the Journal?' The victim of the fraud was not
involved in the securities traded as a result of the breach of confidentiality. 5 But the lower court found that the fraud was "in connection with" the purchase and sale of securities within the meaning of
section 10(b).2° The record does not show whether Justice White
voted to uphold the section 10(b) conviction, nor does it identify
which Justices would have upheld the Carpenterdecision.
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